The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income by Knoll, Michael S
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
11-7-2008 
The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the 
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income 
Michael S. Knoll 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Economics 
Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Knoll, Michael S., "The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of 
Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income" (2008). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 166. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/166 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
* Theodore K. Warner Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor of
Real Estate, Wharton School; Co-director, Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of
Pennsylvania. I thank Alvin Dong for assistance with the research and David Roush for help
with the calculations. I have benefited from a presentation at the London School of
Economics, from the comments of Howard Abrams and Tom Brennan, and especially from
conversations with Chris Sanchirico. This research was not supported by funding from any
sources outside of the University of Pennsylvania.
115
THE TAXATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY CARRIED INTERESTS:
ESTIMATING THE REVENUE EFFECTS OF TAXING PROFIT
INTERESTS AS ORDINARY INCOME
MICHAEL S. KNOLL*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, I estimate the tax revenue effects of taxing private
equity carried interests as ordinary income rather than as long-term
capital gain as under current law. Under reasonable assumptions,
I conclude that the expected present value of additional tax collec-
tions would be between 1 percent and 1.5 percent of capital invested
in private equity funds, or between $2 billion and $3 billion a year.
That estimate, however, makes no allowance for changes in the
structure of such funds or the composition of the partnerships, which
might substantially reduce tax revenues below those estimates.
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1. See AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
“CARRIED INTEREST” CONTROVERSY 1, 3 (2007), http://www.cbpp.org/7-31-07tax.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Alternative Tax Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at 32;
Editorial, Equity Managers’ Loophole; Billion-Dollar Breaks, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 2007,
at A16; Editorial, No Pay, No Patch; The Alternative Minimum Tax Offers a Chance for the
Fiscally Responsible to Stand Up and Be Counted, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2007, at A26;
Editorial, Private-Equity Tax Breaks, A Call To Be Up in Arms, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2007,
at F3; Editorial,  Raising Taxes on Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at 18; Editorial,
Wealth Money Managers Make More, Get Taxed Less, USA TODAY, July 23, 2007, at A10.
3. See, e.g., Alternative Tax Showdown, supra note 2; Equity Managers’ Loophole; Billion-
Dollar Breaks, supra note 2; Private-Equity Tax Breaks, A Call To Be Up in Arms, supra note
2; Raising Taxes on Private Equity, supra note 2; Wealth Money Managers Make More, Get
Taxed Less, supra note 2.
4. Carried Interest, Part I Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing071107.htm [hereinafter Carried Interest,
Part I]; Carried Interest, Part II Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong. (2007), available
at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing073107.htm [hereinafter Carried Interest,
Part II]; Carried Interest, Part III: Pension Issues Before the S. Finance Comm., 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearing090607.htm [hereinafter
Carried Interest, Part III].
5. Compare Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
INTRODUCTION
The controversy over the tax treatment of carried interests held
by the managers of private equity funds continues. Private equity
firms receive a share of the profits—typically 20 percent—earned by
the funds they manage. Under current law, the owners of private
equity firms are taxed at capital gains rates—generally 15 percent—
on those profits. As a result, Warren Buffet and others have noted
that the principals of some of the most successful private equity
firms pay a smaller share of their income in taxes than do many
middle-income Americans.1 In the summer and fall of 2007, the
newspapers were filled with editorials and opinion pieces on the tax
treatment of carried interests. Most of these pieces argued that
carried interests are compensation for services and should be taxed
as ordinary income.2 Many of these pieces characterized the current
tax treatment of carried interests as a massive giveaway.3 In the
summer of 2007, Congress held hearings on the tax treatment of
private equity.4 Except for representatives from the private equity
industry, most of the witnesses urged Congress to tax the managers
of private equity funds more heavily.5 Academics are also writing
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Congressional Budget Office) (advocating treating at least some of these profits as ordinary
income for tax purposes), and Carried Interest, Part II, supra note 4 (statement of Darryll K.
Jones, Professor of Law, Stetson University School of Law) (arguing against the taxation of
fund manager compensation at capital gains rates), with Carried Interest, Part I, supra note
4 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners) (arguing for the
continued taxation of carried interests as capital gain).
6. One can trace much of the attention given to the tax treatment of private equity to the
recent work of Victor Fleischer. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008). Other earlier works that address
the taxation of carried interests include Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley
Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994); Laura E. Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests
Exchanged for Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247 (1991); Mark P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The
Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 TAX L. REV. 519 (1989); Ronald J.
Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for
Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003); Henry Ordower, Taxing Service
Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19 (1992); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing
Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L.
REV. 287 (1991).
7. See, e.g., Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Mark P. Gergen, Fondren
Chair for Faculty Excellence, University of Texas School of Law); Carried Interest, Part II,
supra note 4 (statement of Joseph Bankman, Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law
School); Carried Interest, Part II, supra note 4 (statement of Darryll K. Jones, Professor of
Law, Stetson University School of Law); Fleischer, supra note 6; Schmolka, supra note 6; A
Taxing Matter, http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2007/06/private-equity-.html (June 21,
2007); Posting of Victor Fleischer to Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/07/
the-academic-co.html (July 31, 2007) (listing other supporters of reforming the taxation of
carried interests); Posting of Daniel Shaviro to Start Making Sense, http://danshaviro.
blogspot.com/2007/05/tax-break-for-managers-of-private.html (May 15, 2007, EST 12:09).
8. Posting of Victor Fleischer, supra note 7 (listing supporters of reforming the taxation
of carried interests and claiming a consensus among academics for reform).
9. See, e.g., Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell,
Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners); Carried Interest, Part II, supra note 4 (statement
of Bruce Rosenblum, Chairman, The Private Equity Council).
10. See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests, 116 TAX NOTES 183 (2007);
Chris W. Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit
Shares: What is it? Why is it Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); David A. Weisbach,
about the tax treatment of private equity.6 Most academics are
urging Congress to tax carried interests as ordinary income.7 As
Victor Fleischer noted in July 2007, there appears to be an emerging
consensus among all but the private equity industry itself that the
tax treatment of carried interests is unjustifiably low.8 Yet there are
other voices emerging. In addition to those of the private equity
industry with its dire predictions of the consequences of taxing
carried interests as ordinary income,9 more measured voices are
beginning to see as more complex the tax and economic issues such
a change would uncover.10
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Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation Is Misguided, 116 TAX NOTES 505 (2007).
11. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, More Opposed to Equity Tax Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 7,
2007, at D2.
12. Tom Herman, Changes for 2008 Help Higher-Income Taxpayers—As AMT Looms
Anew, Those in Top Brackets Keep More Deductions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2008, at D3.
13. See id.; No Pay, No Patch, supra note 2.
14. Key House Votes, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 7, 2008, at 63.
15. See Alternative Tax Showdown, supra note 2.
16. See Birnbaum, supra note 11.
17. See Alternative Tax Showdown, supra note 2.
18. Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income (Inst. for Law & Econ., Univ.
of Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 07-20, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1007774.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Buyout Firm Tax Boost Won’t Raise Revenue, Study Says,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?Pid=newsarchive&Sid=
The stakes in the debate over carried interests were raised
substantially when Representative Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) linked
the tax treatment of carried interests with reform of the alternative
minimum tax (AMT).11 Almost four million taxpayers paid the AMT
in 2007.12 Because it is not indexed for inflation, the AMT would
have ensnared an additional 20 million taxpayers that year; each
year, however, Congress has voted to index the AMT for the current
year.13 The annual cost of the AMT patch is now roughly $50
billion.14 Under the pay-as-you-go budgetary rules that Congress
adopted in 2007, tax cuts and expenditure increases must be offset
with other tax increases.15 Later that year Representative Rangel
proposed using the tax revenue from a permanent tax increase on
carried interests to pay for permanent AMT relief.16 Accordingly, the
more revenue collected from holders of carried interests, the smaller
the amount of additional revenue Congress would have to come up
with from other sources to pay for AMT relief.17
In the wake of Representative Rangel’s linking of AMT relief to
carried interest reform, I posted the first draft of this manuscript on
the Social Science Research Network (SSRN).18 That draft contained
revenue estimates for a proposed tax increase on holders of carried
interests.19 A few days later, Ryan Donmoyer of the Bloomberg
News Service wrote an article on Bloomberg.com summarizing my
study and describing its significance for the ongoing debate over
how to tax carried interests.20 Those revenue estimates soon became
120 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:115
ayA3O3cikSNs.
21. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Paid to Listen, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at A18;
Posting of Andrew Ross Sorkin to DealBook, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/
how-much-would-a-private-equity-tax-hike-raise/ (Aug. 23, 2007 8:20 EST).
22. Donmoyer, supra note 20 (quoting Matthew Beck, a spokesman for Congressman
Rangel).
23. Id. (quoting Drew Maloney, Ogilvy Government Relations).
24. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN’S AMENDMENT
IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 3996 (2007).
part of the discourse.21 A spokesman for Congressman Rangel
described my numbers as lower than expected, but indicated that
the Congressman still planned on proceeding with his proposed
legislation because he viewed it as “a basic issue of fairness in the
tax code.”22 A lobbyist hired by a prominent private equity firm, on
the other hand, commented that my study showed that Representa-
tive Rangel’s proposal would not be a “simple and clean” fix.23
Then, in October 2007, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
came out with its own estimates of the additional revenue that
would be raised if carried interests were taxed at ordinary income
tax rates.24 Those estimates were in the same ballpark as my
earlier estimates. The government’s estimates, however, were not
supported with any public explanation. The JCT simply released
the figures. 
All parties with a stake in the carried interest controversy have
an interest in understanding how much additional revenue will be
collected if the taxation of carried interests is changed. Accordingly,
in this Article, I attempt to quantify the tax benefit to private equity
managers of the current treatment of carried interests and the
additional tax revenue that the Treasury would collect if that
treatment were reformed. I also explain the basis for my calcula-
tions, which the JCT failed to do, and respond to some comments
about my earlier draft.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows: Part I
describes how private equity funds are organized, and Part II
describes how participants in such funds are taxed. Part III
estimates the additional revenue that would be collected if carried
interests were taxed at ordinary income tax rates. The estimates in
Part III assume that neither the structure of private equity funds,
nor the composition of investors in those funds, change. In addition,
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25. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, PUBLIC VALUE: A PRIMER ON PRIVATE EQUITY 7 (2007),
available at http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/pec_primer_
layout_final.pdf.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 9, 11.
28. See ARON-DINE, supra note 1, at 4.
29. Id.
30. See generally Alexander Ljungqvist, Matthew Richardson & Daniel Wolfenzon, The
Investment Behavior of Buyout Funds: Theory and Evidence 1 (European Corporate
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 174/2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id
=972640.
31. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return 8 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
in Part III I calculate the additional tax as the expected present
value as of the date the partnership makes its investments of the
additional tax revenues. Part IV converts the estimates generated
in Part III into current tax dollars at the date of collection. These
figures are what Congress uses for budgetary purposes. The next
two parts describe changes that are likely to occur if Congress
raises the tax on private equity, which will blunt the impact of
those increases. Part V describes various ways in which the
structure of private equity funds is likely to change, and Part VI
discusses how the composition of investors in private equity funds
is likely to change. Part VII discusses the JCT’s revenue estimates.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
Private equity funds raise capital in order to purchase and invest
in new and existing businesses.25 These funds are private in the
sense that the ownership interests are not traded on the public
stock exchanges.26 Instead, private equity funds raise capital outside
of the public markets by going directly to investors.27
Private equity funds can be divided into two broad categories:
buyout funds and venture capital funds.28 Buyout funds generally
purchase established companies or divisions of established compa-
nies.29 They acquire these companies for cash, often increasing
their debt level, and seek to restructure and improve the acquired
businesses.30 In contrast, venture capital funds generally invest in
start-up businesses. They seek to make early and mid-stage invest-
ments in businesses that are trying to commercialize new and
developing technologies.31 Venture capital funds thus invest in
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Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-8), available at http://ssrn.abstract=671363.
32. See id. at 43.
33. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 11 exhibit 6.
36. Id. at 9.
37. Id.
38. The general partner frequently provides some capital. There are both tax and non-tax
reasons for doing so. See Andrew W. Needham & Anita Beth Adams, Private Equity Funds,
TAX MGMT. 735, A-18 (2005).
39. See ALAN G. HEVESI, NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND IN-STATE PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM 2 (2006).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. Jennifer A. Post, An Overview of U.S. Venture Capital Funds, ALTASSETS, Nov. 21,
2001, http://www.altassets.com/casefor/countries/2001/nz3600.php.
smaller, riskier businesses than do buyout funds, and they tend to
invest in more companies than do buyout funds.32
Whether it is a venture capital or a buyout fund, the typical
private equity fund is structured as a partnership or a limited lia-
bility company.33 The fund’s investment capital comes from its
limited partners.34 These investors are often wealthy individuals,
charitable foundations with large endowments, pension funds, and
some corporations, especially insurance companies and banks.35
The private equity fund is managed by a private equity firm.36 The
private equity firm is also the fund’s general partner and it decides
which investments the fund will make.37 Although the limited
partners provide nearly all of the fund’s capital,38 they do not
contribute all of that capital when they enter into the partnership.
Instead, they commit to invest a certain amount of capital over time.
That period of time, called the investment period, might continue
for five to six years.39 Over the investment period, the general
partner calls upon these commitments when the partnership makes
investments in portfolio companies.40
Once they have satisfied a capital call, the investors in a private
equity fund generally have little or no liquidity with respect to their
investment.41 The limited partners typically have no right to sell,
transfer, or redeem their interests.42 Instead, the limited partners
are compensated as the fund disposes of its investments either by
selling the companies and distributing the proceeds to the investors,
or by taking the companies public and distributing marketable
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43. See PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 9-10.
44. Id.
45. See Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding
Compensation Arrangements 21-22 (The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series,
Research Paper Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=555626.
46. See Needham & Adams, supra note 38, at A-23.
47. The term carried interest arises because the capital of the limited partners “carries”
the general partner’s interest. Id. at A-17.
48. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 10.
49. For discussion of some of the multitude of variations in the way private equity funds
can structure the carry, see Litvak, supra note 45; Needham & Adams, supra note 38, at A-7
to A-12.
securities to the investors.43 Accordingly, most private equity
investments are made with an eye towards capital appreciation,44
not income.
The distribution of proceeds and the allocation of expenses over
the life of the fund are governed by the partnership agreement.45 A
typical private equity fund requires the partnership to make an
annual payment to the general partner as a management fee. The
typical fee is between 1 and 2 percent, and it is intended to compen-
sate the general partner for its direct expenses in managing the
fund, seeking out new investments, and providing consulting and
other services to the portfolio companies.46
The partnership agreement will also provide the general partner
with a carried interest. The carried interest gives the fund’s
manager a right to receive a share of the profits generated by the
fund without the obligation to provide capital or the risk of sharing
losses.47 Although there are variations, the typical private equity
carry is set at 20 percent.48 Thus, the typical private equity firm will
receive 20 percent of the net profits, but incur none of the net losses,
from each fund that it manages.49
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50. Although hedge funds have many characteristics in common with private equity funds,
including the standard 20 percent carry, this Article deals only with private equity funds.
Because the typical hedge fund trades regularly, it generates short-term capital gain, which
is taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. Thus, the tax issues raised by the carry with
private equity funds are different from those raised with hedge funds.
51. See Post, supra note 42.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 9.
55. I.R.C. § 1222 (2000).
56. I.R.C. § 1 (2000).
57. I.R.C. § 1222 (2000).
58. I.R.C. § 1211 (2000).
II. THE TAXATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS50
For tax purposes, private equity funds are structured as pass-
through entities.51 That is to say, the fund pays no tax. Instead, all
items of income, gain, or loss, and expenses earned or incurred by
the fund are passed through to the fund’s partners.52
Consider the limited partners first. They do not receive a
deduction when they contribute capital to the fund or when the fund
makes an investment. Instead, they receive basis in their interests.
Because most funds invest for appreciation, there is often little
income over the life of the investment.53 Instead, investors look to
make a profit when the fund sells its investments or takes its
portfolio companies public.54
Because investments made through private equity funds are
almost always held for longer than one year, a limited partner’s gain
or loss from an investment in private equity is long-term capital
gain or loss.55 Accordingly, if there is a gain, it is taxed at the
reduced rate that applies to long-term capital gains, which is capped
at 15 percent.56 Similarly, if there is a loss, it is a long-term capital
loss.57 Such a loss can offset capital gains, but not other income.58
Thus, such losses are likely to provide a tax benefit of at most 15
percent.
Furthermore, the carry paid to the general partner reduces the
gain allocated to the limited partners. Thus, the carry reduces the
limited partners’ long-term capital gain. It thus follows that the
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59. Needham & Adams, supra note 38, at A-17.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Charles Kingson, however, suggests that under current law carried interests are
ordinary income. See Carried Interest, Part II, supra note 4 (statement of Charles I. Kingson,
Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
63. See supra note 2.
64. See supra note 3.
carry provides a tax benefit to the limited partners of at most 15
percent.
Under current law, the general partner’s receipt of a carried
interest is not a taxable event.59 The general partner does not
include the interest in income when it is received.60 Furthermore, no
tax is due on the carried interest until profits are realized.61 When
a private equity fund sells an investment, any gain or loss on that
investment is realized. The gain, which is presumably long-term
capital gain, is passed through to the partners. A general partner
with a 20 percent carry will receive a payment equal to 20 percent
of the fund’s profits and will have a corresponding amount of gain
allocated to it. Thus, the income of a principal in a private equity
firm is taxed at the reduced rate that applies to long-term capital
gains and is deferred until sale.62
The discussion above describes the tax treatment of a carried
interest for both the general partner and the limited partners. Much
of the debate over the current tax treatment of carried interests
focuses on the benefit to the general partner of such treatment.
Critics argue that the general partner is performing services and
being compensated for those services, but is being taxed at the
reduced rate available for capital gains.63 Such treatment is widely
considered to be inconsistent with basic federal income tax princi-
ples. It is also viewed by some as a massive giveaway to some very
wealthy individuals.64
In order to understand the consequences of a tax policy, however,
it is often misleading to focus on only one party to a transaction, or
to look at only one piece of a larger transaction. As tax scholars have
come to recognize, the tax advantage or disadvantage of a particular
transaction cannot be assessed simply by looking at one piece of
the  transaction in isolation. Rather, such assessments require the
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65. Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes, Executive Compensation, Taxes and Incentives,
in FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PAUL COOTNER 190-201 (William F. Sharpe
& Cathryn M. Cootner eds., 1982).
66. That method was introduced into the legal literature by Michael Knoll and David
Walker. Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX NOTES
203, 210 n.33 (2004); David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 695, 708-09 (2004). Since that time, it has been used by other scholars and applied to a
range of issues. See, e.g., Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of
the Tree in Its Proper Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 354 n.86 (2006); Michael S. Knoll, The
Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective, 59 SMU L. REV. 721, 725
(2006); Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 11; Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the
Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 580 n.28 (2007); Thomas J. Brennan
& Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in Private Equity and Hedge Fund
Compensation 19 n.39 (Drexel College of Law Research Paper No. 2008-W-01 Feb. 26, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082943; Ethan Yale, Investment Risk and the Tax
Benefit of Deferred Compensation, 62 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
67. Cf. Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95 YALE
L.J. 506, 531-32 (1986); Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax
Perspective, supra note 66, at 749-50.
68. Cf. Halperin, supra note 67, at 531-32; Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted
Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective, supra note 66, at 749-50.
69. Cf. id. at 725.
consideration of all parties to the transaction, after stripping away
extraneous matters, and upon a careful review of the economics. 
The method for making such accurate tax comparisons was
developed twenty-five years ago by Merton Miller and Myron
Scholes.65 In recent years, that method has been picked up by
various legal scholars, and it is now starting to become part of the
regular discourse.66
The essence of that method is to compare two transactional
structures that differ only in terms of their tax consequences. As
that comparative technique is currently employed in the tax
literature, its exercise involves two principal steps.
First, because the tax consequences of a transaction cannot be
understood by just looking at how one party to a transaction is
taxed, it is important to employ an all-parties perspective.67 If a tax
benefit to one party is offset by a tax detriment to another party,
then there is no net benefit to the parties together from using the
structure.68 In such cases, no party is likely to be helped or hurt by
the transaction’s tax treatment. Instead, the parties are likely to
undo the effect of the transaction’s noneconomic tax consequences
through the terms of the transaction.69 Thus, the tax consequences
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70. Such a comparison often entails borrowing or lending to match both cash flow and
economic exposure.
71. Cf. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective,
supra note 66, at 745. There is sometimes a third element to the comparative technique. See
Yale, supra note 66. As Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave showed more than sixty years
ago, the income tax does not tax the return to risk-bearing as long as the tax system taxes
above and below average returns symmetrically. A taxpayer can eliminate the tax on risk by
increasing his investment in the risky asset by 1/(1-t), where t is the tax rate on incremental
gains and losses. Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and
Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388, 411 (1944). Although there are some questions as to how well
the result holds in the economy at large, there is a broad consensus that sophisticated and
wealthy taxpayers do not pay tax on the risk premium. Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-
Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879,
895 (2006). As applied to the managers of private equity funds, many of whom are wealthy
and sophisticated, that result implies that investors in private equity funds are unlikely to
pay tax on the return to risk bearing. Instead, they will pay tax only on the risk-free return.
72. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, supra note 66, at 725.
73. Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 10-18, 21-35.
of a transactional structure should be evaluated globally, for all
parties to a transaction, not just for one party in isolation.
Second, because it is easy to confuse the tax and non-tax conse-
quences of a transactional structure, it is also important to hold the
non-tax consequences of the structure constant. Most simply, paying
fund managers in immediate cash will put cash into their hands
currently, but doing so will fail to tie their compensation to the
performance of their fund. In contrast, providing managers with a
carried interest will not generate any current cash, but it will
expose fund managers to the performance of their fund. Accordingly,
in order to match the non-tax consequences of compensating fund
managers with carried interests, it should be assumed that a fund
manager who is paid in cash upfront will invest in the fund in
order to match the cash flow over the life of the fund of a manager
who receives a carried interest.70 More generally, in order to
understand the consequences of a particular structure, the non-tax
consequences of that structure must be held constant.71 This is
sometimes called making an “apples-to-apples” comparison.72
Chris Sanchirico was the first scholar to apply the comparative
method to compensating private equity fund managers with a
carried interest.73 As Sanchirico shows, the tax benefit to the
general partner of being paid with a carried interest, instead of
cash, consists of two pieces. First, characterizing the tax payment
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74. Id. at 13-16.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 16-18.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. Sanchirico assumes that the fee would not be capitalized and amortized over time,
but deducted immediately. Id. at 4 n.12. The law on whether a payment is to be deducted or
capitalized and amortized is confused. I assume throughout most of this Article that the fee
would be immediately deducted. If it were capitalized and amortized over time, then the
benefit to the limited partners would be smaller. See discussion infra Part V.
79. Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 4.
80. Id. Following Sanchirico, I assume that the limited partners would receive immediate
deductions if the general partner were paid its fee in cash upfront. Later in this Article, I
consider the possibility that the limited partners must capitalize this expense and amortize
it over time. See discussion infra Part V.
81. See Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 4.
82. Id. at 4, 6.
as capital gain instead of ordinary income saves the general partner
the capital gain preference on the carry.74 Second, deferring taxation
from the grant date until realization defers tax on the present value
of the carry until realization.75 Moreover, as Sanchirico shows, the
first benefit is proportional to the general partner’s capital gain
preference, and the second is proportional to the general partner’s
tax rate on capital gains.76
Sanchirico also argues that the general partner’s tax benefit from
being paid with equity (as opposed to immediate cash) is offset by
the corresponding detriment to the limited partners.77 If, instead of
receiving a carried interest, the general partner were paid its fee
in cash upfront, the limited partners would deduct that fee.78 In
that case, the payment of the fee would generate a tax benefit to
the limited partners at ordinary income rates.79 Thus, the benefit
to the general partner of being paid with a carried interest instead
of cash—conversion from ordinary income into capital gain and
deferral of tax from grant until realization—is offset by the
detriment to the limited partner—conversion and deferral.80
Accordingly, if the tax rates, both for ordinary income and
capital gain, are the same for the general partner and for all of the
limited partners, then there is neither a net benefit nor a net loss
from the current tax treatment of carried interests.81 In such
circumstances, reforming the taxation of carried interests—by
treating receipt as current ordinary income and payment as current
ordinary deduction—will not increase net tax collections.82 The
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83. Id. at 6, 13-20. Fleischer also recognizes this. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 13.
84. See Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 38.
85. Id. For investments already made, however, there will be no such offsets. The limited
partners will not agree to them. Thus, changing the tax rule will transfer wealth from general
partners to limited partners.
86. As shown by Sanchirico, the key to the equality is that the capital gain preference is
the same for both groups. Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 48, 54.
87. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 11 exhibit 6. The data given do not
separate domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investors generally escape tax even if they
are wealthy individuals.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 5.
90. See id. at 7-8, 39. Once again, existing deals would not change.
additional tax collected from the general partner will offset the
reduced tax collections from limited partners.83 In such circum-
stances, we would expect the economic terms of the deal between
the general partner and the limited partners to change to reflect the
new tax rule.84 A shift of the tax burden away from limited partners
and towards the general partner will likely lead the limited partners
to grant the general partner a larger carried interest in order to
compensate for the shift in the tax burden.85
Of course, the conclusion that there would be no net change in tax
collections from treating carried interests as current ordinary
income assumes that the limited partners would pay tax at the
same rate as the general partner.86 This is likely to be true for
limited partners that are wealthy individuals—the source of roughly
20 percent of the capital raised from limited partners.87 Where this
is not true, there can be a net increase in tax revenue by changing
the tax treatment of carried interests. Most simply, for untaxed
limited partners, such as pension funds and endowments, which
provide at least 50 percent of private equity capital,88 changing
the tax treatment of carried interests would have no direct tax
consequences. In such circumstances, assuming no restructuring
of transactions, the proposed change would increase taxes on
private equity investments. The amount of the increase would be
the increased tax paid by the general partner because there is no
direct effect on untaxed limited partners.89 After such a change, the
economic terms of the deal might change to share the burden
between the general partner and limited partners.90
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92. I.R.C. § 11 (2000).
93. See Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 25.
94. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Raising Taxes on Private Equity, supra note 2, at 18.
97. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, Blackstone Proves Carried Interests Can Be Valued, 115
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Another example involves corporate limited partners—the source
of less than 20 percent of the capital for private equity funds.91
Corporations do not have a capital gains preference; they pay tax at
the same rate on ordinary income and capital gain.92 Corporate
limited partners would, thus, get no benefit from treating the
payment of carried interests as an ordinary deduction. They are
generally indifferent between offsets to capital gain and ordinary
deductions. For such investors, the only consequence of reforming
the taxation of carried interests would be to accelerate the tax
from realization to grant. Because the benefit of acceleration
depends on tax rates, the benefit from accelerating tax for a
corporation in the 35 percent tax bracket would exactly offset the
detriment to the general partner. The detriment to the general
partner of recharacterizing ordinary income as capital gain,
however, would not be offset by any benefit to the corporate limited
partners. Thus, in such circumstances, the net effect of reform
would be to increase tax collections.93
III. ESTIMATING THE REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING CARRIED
INTERESTS AT ORDINARY INCOME TAX RATES
That brings us to the heart of this Article: estimating the revenue
consequences of taxing carried interests as ordinary income instead
of as capital gains. Under current law, a carried interest is taxed to
the general partner who receives it as long-term capital gain when
realized.94 Commentators have proposed taxing the general partner
at ordinary income tax rates.95 Under some proposals, such income
would continue to be taxed when it is realized.96 Under other
proposals, it would be taxed when granted, and any subsequent gain
or loss would be treated as long-term capital gain or loss when
realized.97 In this Part, I consider the revenue effects of both types
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98. See infra Part V.
99. See PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 11 exhibit 6.
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101. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 11 exhibit 6 (outlining the percent of
capital invested in private equity by pension funds and endowments/foundations). About 13
percent of the capital comes from funds of funds, which aggregate investors’ capital and invest
in multiple funds. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 11 exhibit 6. In the calculations
below, I treat these funds as coming from wealthy individuals who are outside of the U.S. tax
system (i.e., neither citizens nor residents) in order to compensate for the failure of the data
to separate foreign and domestic wealthy investors (only the latter pay U.S. tax on their
profits from investing in private equity). Thus, I assume roughly two-thirds of the more than
30 percent of private equity capital coming from wealthy individuals, family offices, and funds
of funds comes from wealthy U.S. taxpayers and that the other one-third comes from wealthy
foreign taxpayers.
102. See I.R.C. §§ 501, 881 (2000).
of reform for the tax treatment of carried interests assuming that
private equity funds continue to use the same transactional
structure and the composition of the funds remains unchanged. In
subsequent Parts, I speculate on how the composition and structure
of private equity funds might change in response to carried interest
tax reform, and what impact those changes might have on revenue
collections.98
There are three categories of limited partners to consider. First,
there are wealthy taxpaying individuals—about 20 percent of
capital.99 For them, the tax benefit of the proposed change exactly
offsets the detriment to the general partners.100 Thus, in the
calculations that follow, I assume that for 20 percent of the capital,
there will be no net tax consequence from changing the tax treat-
ment of carried interests. Second, there are tax-exempt and foreign
investors, neither of which pay any U.S. income tax on their
earnings from investments in private equity—about 60 percent of
capital.101 Such limited partners are not affected directly by any
change in tax treatment because they do not pay taxes.102 Thus, in
the calculations below, I assume that for 60 percent of the capital,
the consequences of changing how the carry is taxed depends solely
on the consequences to the general partner. As described above, for
the general partner, private equity tax reform will convert what
would have been capital gain into ordinary income, and, if the carry
is taxed when granted, it will also accelerate taxation from realiza-
tion to grant. Third, there are corporate limited partners—less than
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103. PRIVATE EQUITY COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 11 exhibit 6.
104. See Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Peter Orszag, Director,
Congressional Budget Office).
105. Sheppard, supra note 97, at 1238-40.
106. See Ludovic Phalippou, Investing in Private Equity Funds: A Survey, RES. FOUND.
LITERATURE REVS., Apr. 2007, at 14, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980243; Litvak,
supra note 45, at 20; Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity
Funds 10 (July 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=996334).
107. See Phalippou, supra note 106, at 9; Litvak, supra note 45, at 18-19; Metrick &
Yasuda, supra note 106, at 11.
108. Representatives of the private equity industry often say that many of their members
regularly turn down capital, and that they are undercompensated given the value that they
produce for clients. Economists, however, are skeptical. See, e.g., Phalippou, supra note 106,
at 11-12. Nonetheless, if the limited partners’ interest are worth more than they pay for them,
then the general partner’s carried interests is also worth more than my calculations imply.
In that case, the additional revenue from reforming the tax burden on carried interests would
be greater than implied below.
109. Consider a simple example. Assume a single one-year investment with a 20 percent
carry. Assume the market interest rate is 10 percent, and that the investment is completely
riskless. The investment costs $1000. In order for the limited partners to be willing to pay
$1000 to participate in the private equity fund that owns the investment, the investment
must pay $1125 in one year. In that case, $25 or 20 percent of the $125 gain will be paid to
the general partner. Thus, the general partner’s interest is worth $22.73, or 2.27 percent of
invested capital, when made. That will also leave the limited partners with $100 profit and
20 percent of capital.103 As for them, assumed to be 20 percent in the
calculations, the switch will be costly because of the recharac-
terization, but not because of the timing.
One of the arguments against taxing carried interests at the time
they are granted is that they are too speculative to value for tax
purposes.104 Yet it is possible to estimate their value.105 Although 20
percent is the standard carry, there are variations.106 Moreover, not
only does the carry percentage vary across funds, but the way the
carry is calculated also varies across funds.107 That variation
suggests that general partners and limited partners enter into these
contracts in competitive markets. Firms that provide more valuable
services charge more, and those that provide less valuable services
charge less. That, in turn, suggests that private equity firms are not
leaving money on the table, but rather they are entering into
contracts that pay them what they are worth. Those contracts are
also probably close to the maximum amounts that the limited
partners would be willing to pay them.108 Thus, the carry can be
valued as the present value of the future stream of payments.109
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$1000 return of capital. Thus, if the investment earns 12.5 percent, the limited partners will
earn 10 percent on their capital, with the other 2.5 percent going to the general partner. The
problem with trying to value the carry by simply grossing up the market return by one minus
the carried interest percentage is that investments in private equity are risky, and the carried
interest does not participate in the fund’s downside, only the upside.
110. See, e.g., Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 106, at 16.
111. See NEIL A. CHRIS, BLACK-SCHOLES AND BEYOND: OPTION PRICING MODELS 24-25
(1997).
112. The approach below follows that of Metrick and Yasuda, who use option pricing
techniques to value private equity contracts. See generally Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 106.
113. See generally CHRIS, supra note 111.
114. For a discussion of the different ways that such payments are structured, see
Needham & Adams, supra note 38, at A-7 to A-11.
115. See CHRIS, supra note 111, at 128.
116. Id. at 2.
117. Id. at 128.
As others have noted, a carried interest is effectively a call
option.110 A call option gives the holder the right, but not the
obligation, to purchase an asset at a specified price, referred to as
the exercise or strike price.111 The carried interest is an option on
the private equity fund. In the usual case, it is the right to acquire
20 percent of the fund for 20 percent of the capital. The value of an
option is a function of a series of variables, including strike price (S),
asset price (P), volatility (V), and time to expiration (T). Thus, we
can write C = C (S, P, V, T). Moreover, if the fund acquires the asset
for P0 and the general partner receives a carried interest that is
worth C, then in order for the limited partners to be as well off
investing in the fund as investing on their own, the underlying
asset must be worth P = P0 + C when it is acquired. Accordingly, by
solving for C, we can solve for the value of the carried interest.112
The best-known method for valuing a call option is the Black-
Scholes option pricing equation.113 I arbitrarily set the strike price,
S, at $100. In many but not all private equity funds, the strike price
is set at the cost of acquisition without a hurdle rate or preferred
return to the limited partners.114 Thus, P0 is also $100, which means
that P = $100 + C.
The key parameter in the Black-Scholes equation is volatility.115
The more volatile the underlying asset, the more valuable is a call
on that asset.116 The reason why call values increase with volatility
is because very large returns lead to large profits, but losses,
whether small or large, all lead to options that expire unexercised.117
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118. Id. at 29-30.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Brian J. Hall, Transferable Stock Options (TSOs) and the Coming Revolution in
Equity-Based Pay, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 fig.1A (2004).
121. Id.
122. See Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Tax Problems of Investment Funds, 60 TAX
LAW. 583, 588 (2007).
123. See, e.g., Tony Jackson, The Wonders of Life in the Rear View Mirror, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2007, at 20. The volatility of owning an asset increases with leverage.
124. Thus, the carry represents an option on a portfolio and not a portfolio of options (one
on each company).
125. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 106, at 15.
126. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
127. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 106, at 15.
128. See, e.g., CHRIS, supra note 111, at 140.
Accordingly, because volatility increases the payoff when the option
expires in the money and has no impact on the payoff when the
option expires out of the money, the value of a call option increases
with volatility.118
Data for volatility, V, come from several sources. The Black-
Scholes equation is often expressed in a way that uses the annual
standard deviation of the price of the underlying asset.119 For the
typical NASDAQ stock, V is 60 percent a year.120 For the typical
NYSE stock, it is 30 percent a year.121 Private equity funds usually
invest in smaller and riskier companies;122 they also use more
leverage than most public companies.123 Most funds invest in more
than one company, and the carry is typically calculated based on
the performance of the portfolio, not for each portfolio company
separately.124 The risk of a portfolio of assets, as measured by
standard deviation, varies in proportion to the square root of the
number of assets. Thus, if a typical fund would invest in nine
portfolio companies, the risk of the portfolio, measured by its
standard deviation, would be one-third of the risk of a single
company in the portfolio. The typical private buyout fund makes
about eleven investments.125 Venture capital funds, however,
usually invest in riskier companies.126 They also make more
investments—closer to twenty-five than eleven.127 These effects are
likely to offset one another. In this Article, I assume a volatility of
20 percent for the typical fund.
The value of a call option also depends upon the time until its
maturity.128 The value of a call option is an increasing function of
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131. See, e.g., CHRIS, supra note 111, at 140.
132. Thomas Brennan has developed calculators that replicate many of the tables in this
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text. See Thomas J. Brennan, Java Calculator of Carried Interest and Taxes,
http://tbrenn.net/civ (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
the time to maturity.129 Although there is no express time limit for
the call option embedded in the carry, limited partners have
expectations about how long their funds will be invested before they
are repaid. Most private equity funds hold their individual invest-
ments between four and seven years.130
There is one more parameter that is required to calculate the
value of the carry as a call option. That parameter is the risk-free
interest rate.131 I use an interest rate of 5 percent, which is in line
with recent short-term taxable government interest rates.
The above information is sufficient to calculate the value of the
carry as a call option using the Black-Scholes formula. Using Excel’s
numerical methods, I calculated the value of the carry for terms
ranging from four to seven years. These results are provided
below.132
Table 1
Value of Carried Interest
(as a percentage of invested capital)
Term (years) 4 5 6 7
Value of car-
ried interest
5.91 6.87 7.76 8.6
As Table 1 shows, the value (at grant) of the carried interest for a
typical private equity fund, assumed to have a volatility of 20
percent and a term for each investment of between four and seven
years, ranges from about 6 percent to about 8.5 percent of the
capital managed by the fund.
That range can be translated from a percentage of investment
capital into dollars by multiplying it by the amount of capital
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133. See Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Congressional Budget Office).
134. Some commentators have criticized my estimates for using too low of a figure for
future capital investments in private equity funds. See, e.g., posting of Victor Fleischer to
Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2007/08/index.html (Aug. 20, 2007). It is easy
to adjust any of my estimates for a different amount of capital simply by multiplying my
estimate for the revenue effect as a percentage of invested capital by an estimate of invested
capital. Alternatively, any of my estimates for the dollar amount of increased revenue can be
multiplied by the ratio of any estimate for annual investments to $200 billion—the figure I
use for my estimates.
135. In addition, if the total amount of capital invested in private equity is as much as $1
trillion, see Carried Interest, Part I, supra note 4 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Congressional Budget Office), then the aggregate value of all carried interests (measured as
of the grant date) is between $60 and $85 billion.
136. For a discussion of these alternatives, see id.
137. H.R. 2834, introduced by Rep. Levin and others, would tax carried interests in this
manner. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
invested in private equity funds. There is substantial volatility in
the amount of capital private equity funds raise each year. Private
equity funds raised more than $200 billion in 2000, 2006, and 2007,
but less than that in all other years.133 Thus, an estimate of $200
billion invested each year is well above historical averages, but
below the current rate of investment.134 Thus, using the $200 billion
figure, the aggregate value of carried interests granted each year is
between $12 and $17 billion.135
The next step is to estimate the tax revenue from private equity
under different possible tax treatments. I consider three alternative
tax treatments:136
1) The current tax treatment: the carry is treated as long-
term capital gain by the general partner and an offset to
long-term capital gain by the limited partners at realiza-
tion.
2) Character change only: the carry is treated as ordinary
income by the general partner and an offset to ordinary
income by the limited partners at realization.137
3) Character and timing change: the carry is treated as
ordinary income by the general partner and an offset to
ordinary income by the limited partners at grant. Subse-
quent changes in value are taxed as long-term capital gain
by the general partner.
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For each of the three possible tax treatments for the carried
interest, I calculate the present value of the tax paid by the general
partner at the grant date. Under current law, the general partner’s
carry is taxed upon realization as long-term capital gain.138 Thus,
the general partner will pay the federal government 15 percent of
the realized value of its carry when it receives payment. That is
equivalent to the general partner paying tax upfront at 15 percent
on the present value of its carry, and exempting the general partner
from taxation on any gain or loss until the investment is liquidated.
Thus, the present value of the tax paid by the general partner is 15
percent of the present value of its carried interest.
I apply that same logic to the possibility of taxing the carry as
ordinary income upon realization. Using the current top ordinary
income tax rate of 35 percent,139 the present value of the general
partner’s tax is 35 percent of the present value of the carried
interest. Thus, the tax cost of the carry to the general partner, and
the additional tax revenue collected by the government, is two and
one-third times as large as the amount collected under current law.
The third possibility—both character and timing changes—is
subject to two interpretations. First, it can be thought of as taxing
the carry at ordinary income tax rates when received and treating
any subsequent gain or loss as long-term capital gain or loss.
Alternatively, it can be thought of as paying the general partner in
cash and having the general partner purchase a 20 percent profit
interest in the partnership. In either event, the general partner will
include the value of the carry in income immediately and pay tax at
the 35 percent rate. The general partner will then have a basis in
the carry equal to the amount taken into income. Upon realization,
the general partner will take the value of the carry into income and
offset that value with basis. These amounts are taxed at the 15
percent long-term capital gain rate.140 The present value of the
former is 15 percent of the value of the carry; the present value of
the latter is that value at vesting discounted, at the risk-free
138 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:115
141. This calculation relies on the Domar-Musgrave result. See supra note 71.
142. All tax revenue calculations in this Part are shown as the present value of tax
collections as of the date of grant.
143. Because the capital invested by the general partner is often a small portion of the
capital invested by the limited partners, see supra note 38 and accompanying text, I have
ignored it in making my calculations. Instead, I assume that 100 percent of the capital comes
from limited partners.
interest rate, to the grant date.141 The results are presented in the
following table:142
Table 2A
Present Value of Tax Collections from General Partner
Under Alternative Tax Regimes for Carried Interests
(as a percentage of invested capital)
Term (years) 4 5 6 7
Current Treatment 0.89 1.03 1.16 1.29
Character Change
Only
2.07 2.4 2.72 3.01
Character and Tim-
ing Change
2.23 2.63 3.01 3.38
Table 2A gives the present value of tax collections from the general
partner as a function of total capital invested under different
assumptions.143 Accordingly, the tax consequences to the general
partner of reforming the tax treatment of carried interests are given
by the differences between rows. Thus, the additional tax revenue
that the government would collect from fund managers if the carry
were taxed as ordinary income upon grant is simply the difference
between the last row (character and timing change) and the second
row (current treatment). The additional tax that would be collected
if the carry were taxed as ordinary income when paid is the
difference between the third row (character change only) and the
second row (current treatment). These differences are presented in
the following table:
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Table 2B
Present Value of Additional Tax Collections from 
General Partner
Under Alternative Tax Regimes for Carried Interests
(as a percentage of invested capital)
Term (years) 4 5 6 7
Character Change
Only
1.18 1.37 1.55 1.72
Character and Tim-
ing Change
1.34 1.6 1.85 2.09
If both the character and timing were changed, the additional tax
collected from the general partner would be about 1.3 percent of
invested capital for a four-year holding period and about 2.1 percent
for a seven-year holding period. Assuming $200 billion is invested
each year in private equity funds, the additional tax collected would
amount to between $2.7 billion and $4.2 billion per year. If,
however, only the character were changed, the present value of the
additional tax collected would be about 1.2 percent for a four-year
holding period and about 1.7 percent for a seven-year holding
period. Thus, the present value of additional tax collections would
be between $2.4 billion and $3.4 billion annually. 
Table 2B also suggests that, for the general partner, the larger
item is whether the carry is taxed as ordinary income or capital
gain. According to Table 2B, the character change accounts for
about 80 to 90 percent of additional tax revenue, whereas the timing
change accounts for only about 10 to 20 percent. As a percentage of
capital invested in private equity funds, accelerating taxation
increases tax collections between 0.16 and 0.37 percent. That
translates into $320 million to $740 million a year.
The calculations in Tables 2A and 2B look only at the cost to the
general partner of reforming the tax law. Specifically, these tables
do not take into account the tax consequences to the limited
partners. If the carry were treated as ordinary income by the
general partner, it would likely generate an ordinary deduction for
the limited partners. Unless that deduction were deferred, the
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billion. Similarly, for the seven-year holding period, the tax currently collected is 1.29 percent,
and it would rise to 3.01 percent if carried interests were taxed as ordinary income. The
difference would be 1.72 percent, and 20 percent of that difference is 0.34 percent. Thus, the
additional tax collected would be 1.38 percent of invested capital. That implies an annual
increase in taxes of $2.8 billion.
147. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
limited partners would take that deduction when the general
partner includes the carry in income.144 
Consider first a change in tax character only. The only limited
partners whose taxes would be affected are wealthy individuals
subject to the U.S. federal income tax—i.e., U.S. citizens and
residents. Assuming such investors currently account for 20 percent
of the capital in private equity funds,145 the value of their deductions
would be 20 percent of the value of the tax collected from the
general partner. It thus follows that the additional tax collections
provided by changing the character of carried interests from capital
gain to ordinary income would fall from 1.18 percent of invested
capital to 0.95 percent with a four-year holding period, and from
1.72 percent to 1.38 percent with a seven-year holding period.
Expressed in terms of dollars, the additional revenue would fall
from $2.4 billion to $1.9 billion for a four-year holding period and
from $3.4 billion to $2.8 billion for a seven-year holding period.146 
If both the character and timing were changed, then corporate
limited partners would also be affected. Assuming that taxpaying
corporations account for another 20 percent of capital,147 then the
value of their increased deductions from accelerating the taxation
of carried interests would be 20 percent of the value of the addi-
tional taxes collected from the general partner if both character and
timing were changed instead of just a change in timing. Accordingly,
the present value of the additional tax revenue from changing both
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the character and timing of carried interests would fall to 1 percent
of invested capital with a four-year horizon and to 1.5 percent with
a seven-year horizon. Expressed in dollars, the present value of the
additional revenue would be $2 billion with a four-year investment
horizon and $3 billion with a seven-year horizon. The present value
of these additional tax collections as a percentage of invested capital
are given in the following table:
Table 3
Present Value of Additional Tax Collections
Under Alternative Tax Regimes for Carried Interests
(as a percentage of invested capital)
Term (years) 4 5 6 7
Character
Change Only
0.95 1.1 1.24 1.38
Character and
Timing Change
1 1.17 1.34 1.5
The above analysis and the figures in Table 3 assume no change in
structure and no change in the composition of the limited partners.
The possibility of such changes, discussed in Parts V and VI, would
likely reduce collections below these amounts. 
IV. CONVERTING THE ESTIMATES FROM PRESENT VALUES INTO
DOLLARS
In Part III, I estimated the additional tax revenue from taxing
carried interests at ordinary income tax rates. The calculations in
that Part gave the present value of the additional tax collected as of
the date that the interest is granted. In other words, the calcula-
tions reduced a stream of future tax receipts to their present value
as of the grant date. Such a method provides a single statistic that
summarizes the value of additional taxes collected at different
times. That statistic also represents the real economic burden of the
tax. In addition, that method avoids the necessity of speculating
what future returns on investments in private equity will be.
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148. Such revenue estimates do not properly take into account differences in timing and
risk. See JUDY XANTHOPOULOS & MARY M. SCHMITT, REVENUE ESTIMATES AND RETIREMENT
POLICY 4-8 (2008).
There are, however, circumstances in which one might want to
estimate the amount of tax that will be collected in dollars, not just
as the expected present value of future tax collections. The most
obvious reason for wanting a dollar estimate is that the federal
government operates under budget rules that are largely based on
total tax and spending over a period of years and not present values
as of a given date.148 Accordingly, this Part addresses how to
estimate the tax revenue in dollars, not the present value of that
revenue, that the Treasury can expect to collect by taxing carried
interests as ordinary income.
The estimates in this Part are made separately for a change in
character only and for a change in both character and timing. In
contrast with earlier Parts, where the analysis of joint character
and timing changes was more complicated than the analysis of
character changes only, here the situation is reversed. It turns out
that the additional tax revenue that would be collected if carried
interests were taxed at grant at ordinary income tax rates is
independent of the realized return on private equity investments.
Accordingly, I discuss a joint change in character and timing before
turning my attention to a character change only.
A. The Additional Tax Revenue from Changing Both the      
Character and Timing of Taxation
If carried interests were taxed at ordinary income tax rates when
granted, then grants made before the reform took effect would be
taxed differently than those made after it became effective. In this
section, I look at the additional tax revenue from carried interest
tax reform assuming that all investments in private equity were
made under the new tax rules. That is to say, I look at the addi-
tional tax revenue in a representative year assuming that the grant
was treated as ordinary income when it was received and as
ordinary expense when it was paid, with an accompanying adjust-
ment to basis. In this case, and assuming that the level of invest-
ment remains constant over time, each year the general partner’s
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149. These values can be expressed mathematically. If we denote the value of carried
interests as a share of limited partner capital by c, the total amount of limited partner capital
by k, and the ordinary income and long-term capital gain tax rates by t and tcg, then the
additional tax paid by the general partner each year is given by ck(t - tcg). If we denote the
share of private equity limited partnership capital provided by wealthy taxpaying individuals
by a, then their annual tax savings from the reform (assuming that they receive an ordinary
deduction for their share of the carry) is given by ack(t - tcg). Thus, in aggregate, the additional
tax collected each year from taxing carried interests at ordinary tax rates upon grant is given
by (1 - a)ck(t - tcg).
150. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
ordinary income at grant would equal its recovery of basis that same
year upon sale. In such a steady state, the tax revenue consequences
to the general partner of reforming the tax treatment of carried
interests would be simply the general partner’s loss of the capital
gain preference on the grant it received. Assuming the reform also
gave limited partners an equivalent ordinary deduction, their
ordinary deductions at grant would replace equal amounts of offset
to long-term capital gain at sale. Accordingly, the general partner’s
tax savings would equal the excess value of their ordinary deduc-
tions from the grant over an equivalent offset to long-term capital
gain.149 Among the limited partners, the reform would not directly
affect untaxed limited partners—foreigners and nonprofits.150
Similarly, corporate taxpayers would be unaffected because they are
taxed at the same rate on ordinary income and long-term capital
gain.151 Only wealthy taxpaying individuals would be affected, and
they would benefit to the same extent that the general partner was
hurt on the portion of the carried interest that they pay. Thus, the
additional tax generated would be the capital gain preference on
that portion of the carried interest that was granted to the general
partner from limited partners, other than taxpaying individuals. 
Expressed differently, the additional tax collected each year
would be a function of the capital gain preference, the percentage of
funds coming from taxpaying individuals, and the value of the carry
at the time of grant. Specifically, the additional tax collected would
be independent of the realized rate of return on private equity
investments. The additional revenue can, thus, be easily calculated.
The capital gain preference is 20 percent, taxpaying individuals
account for 20 percent of private equity capital, and the value of the
carry comes from Table 1 above. Under these assumptions, the
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152. These numbers are less than the numbers in Table 2B, the present value of the
additional tax collected from both character and timing changes. That is because accelerating
tax payments does not increase aggregate tax collections, although it does increase the
present value of such collections. These numbers are identical to the numbers in Table 2B for
the present value of the character change only. That is because the value of the carry at grant
is equal to the present value of the expected payment on the carry upon sale.
additional tax that would be collected is calculated in the following
table:
Table 4
Additional Tax Collections
Both Character and Timing Change
(as a percentage of invested capital)
Term (years) 4 5 6 7
Character
and Timing
Change
1.18 1.37 1.55 1.72
According to Table 4, the steady-state additional tax collections from
taxing carried interests as ordinary income at grant, and thereafter
as capital investments, range from 1.18 percent of invested capital
with a four-year investment horizon to 1.72 percent of invested
capital with a seven year horizon. Accordingly, assuming annual
capital contributions of $200 billion per year, the additional tax
revenue collected would be $2.4 billion for investments with a four-
year term and $3.4 billion for investments with a seven-year term.152
B. The Additional Tax Revenue from Changing Only the      
Character of Taxation
Consider now the more likely reform of changing only the
character of carried interests, not also the time at which such
interests are taxed. In this case, there would be no offsetting in-
clusion (and deduction) at grant, with a corresponding basis
adjustment at sale. Instead, the realized value of the carried
interest would be taxed as ordinary income when paid. As a result,
the actual tax collections would be a function of realized values.
Accordingly, the major obstacle to coming up with a number for how
much additional tax revenue the government will collect if Congress
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153. The analysis below is for the average rate of return for private equity funds assuming
that no funds have net losses. The calculations would be more complicated if some funds
produced losses. 
were to tax carried interests at ordinary rates upon realization is
that no one knows today what will be the future returns (average or
aggregate) on investments in private equity. The actual realized
return over the life of the investments made today will depend upon
various factors, including how well private equity managers do in
choosing investments, how effective they are in managing those
investments, and what happens to the economy over the next few
years. Even if we put aside claims that private equity will outper-
form the broader market, no one knows how broad market indexes
will perform over the next several years. Yet, it is this performance
that will determine the tax revenue actually collected. The possibil-
ity that private equity will do differently than broad market
averages makes any predictions even more difficult.153
Economists and investment professionals commonly speak in
terms of annualized rates of return. Obviously, the total tax that
would be collected from taxing private equity as ordinary income
will depend on the annualized rate of return earned on those
investments. The following table gives the future value of $1
invested for a given number of years for different annualized rates
of return. The term of investment is given along the top row and the
annualized rate of return is given along the first column. For
example, if $1 were invested for five years at 10 percent it would
grow to $1.61. 
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154. The dollar values increase with the horizon for two reasons: returns are compounded
over a longer period of time and more funds are invested in private equity at any given time.
Table 5
Future Value of $1 as a Function of Interest Rate and Term of
Investment
                     Term 
                       (years)
Annualized
Return
(percent)
4 5 6 7
5% 1.216 1.276 1.340 1.407
10% 1.464 1.611 1.772 1.949
15% 1.749 2.011 2.313 2.660
20% 2.074 2.488 2.986 3.583
25% 2.441 3.052 3.815 4.768
As shown in Table 5, if private equity funds were to earn 10 percent
per year, then the multiplier would be 1.464 for a four-year horizon
and 1.949 for a seven-year horizon. The payment to the holder of the
carried interest is 20 percent of the excess of the multiplier over one.
Accordingly, the realized value of carried interests in private equity
funds capitalized four years earlier would be 9.3 percent of invested
capital, and that of funds capitalized seven years earlier would be
18.9 percent of invested capital. Thus, assuming annual invest-
ments in private equity of $200 billion, the realized value of carried
interests would be $18.6 billion for a four-year horizon and $37.8
billion for a seven-year horizon.154 If the annualized rate of return
were higher, say 20 percent, then the multiplier would be 2.364 for
a four-year horizon and 3.583 for a seven-year horizon. Accordingly,
the holders of carried interests would receive more than they did
with a 10 percent return. With a four-year horizon, they would
receive 27.3 percent of invested capital, or $54.6 billion, and with a
seven-year horizon they would receive 51.7 percent of capital, or
$103.4 billion.
The additional tax paid by the general partner would be the
capital gain preference on the payment the general partner
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155. This can be expressed mathematically. Start with the general partner. Denote the
aggregate increase in the value of the contributed capital (i.e., the equity value of the firm
assuming that debt is not paid down) by m. Denote the general partner’s carry percentage by
p. The general partner is paid pk(m - 1) on the capital invested (k). Because that amount is
taxed as ordinary income (t) instead of long-term capital gain (tcg), the additional tax collected
from general partners would be pk(m - 1)(t - tcg). Because the only limited partners affected
by the change are wealthy taxpaying individuals, their tax savings would be apk(m - 1)(t - tcg).
Accordingly, the additional net tax collections from taxing carried interests as ordinary
income can be written as (1 - a)pk(m - 1)(t - tcg). 
received. Because the only limited partners directly affected would
be wealthy individuals, their benefit would exactly offset the
detriment to the general partner on that portion of the carry paid by
such limited partners. Thus, the net increase in tax collections
would be the additional tax paid by the general partner on that
portion of the carried interest that is not paid by taxpaying individ-
ual limited partners.155 Accordingly, in the following table I
calculate as a percentage of invested capital the average yearly
additional tax collections from taxing carried interests as ordinary
income instead of long-term capital gain when paid. Table 6
calculates the additional tax as a function of different annualized
rates of return and different holding periods for investments in
private equity.
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Table 6
Additional Tax Collections
Character Change Only
(as a percentage of invested capital)
     Term
          (years)
Annualized
Return
(percent)
4 5 6 7
 5% 0.69 0.88 1.09 1.3
10% 1.49 1.95 2.47 3.04
15% 2.4 3.24 4.2 5.31
20% 3.44 4.77 6.36 8.27
25% 5.94 6.57 9.01 12.06
Thus, for an annual rate of return of 10 percent, the additional tax
revenue would be 1.49 percent of invested capital or $3 billion with
a four-year horizon and 3.04 percent of invested capital or $6.1
billion with a seven-year horizon. The additional tax return would
increase if the annualized rate of return were higher. If the annual
return were 20 percent, then the increased revenue would be 3.44
percent of invested capital or $6.9 billion with a four-year horizon
and 8.27 percent of invested capital or $16.5 billion with a seven-
year horizon.
As is shown in Table 6, the actual tax collections are highly
sensitive to realized rates of return. This raises an obvious question:
What number should we use for the future annualized rate of
return? I do not know, nor does anyone else. Any given rate of
return is pure speculation. Private equity firms are close-lipped
about their realized returns, and good statistics do not appear to be
available. In addition, any such statistics are for past performance,
and past performance is not a good predictor of future performance
in financial markets. In addition, the presence of excess returns
tends to attract imitators, and their competition drives down future
returns. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that investors in
private equity already earn a competitive return, on average, and no
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156. See generally Robert M. Conroy & Robert S. Harris, How Good Are Private Equity
Returns?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 96 (2007).
157. Abrams, supra note 10, at 186.
158. Id.
more; that is to say, adjusted for risk, they earn the same return, on
average, as is available from investing in other assets.156 Expressed
somewhat differently, the government’s tax claim on the profits of
private equity fund managers is a highly-leveraged, and hence very
risky, asset. If it has the potential (and expectation) of a higher
average return, it is because it involves so much risk. Presumably,
the federal government could achieve the same risk and return
profile by investing some of its tax revenue directly in similarly
highly-leveraged investments. 
V. CHANGING THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
The discussion above assumes that after any reform, investors
will continue to make the same investments in private equity in the
same manner as they have in the past. In reality, however, it is
likely that investors in and managers of private equity funds will
respond in one or both of the following ways in an attempt to blunt
the impact of any tax increase. First, they may change the structure
of private equity funds. Second, they may change the composition of
the partnerships. This part considers the first response; the next
part considers the second response.
A. Loans from Limited Partners to the General Partner
Howard Abrams has argued that the current tax treatment of
private equity transactions could still be achieved, even if the carry
were taxed as ordinary income to the general partner, through a
simple change in the structure of private equity funds with no
change in the underlying economics.157 Instead of paying a carry,
Abrams suggests that limited partners pay 80 percent of the
acquisition cost for an 80 percent share of capital and profits and
lend the general partner 20 percent of the acquisition cost, which
the general partner would then contribute to the partnership in
exchange for its 20 percent interest.158 The limited partners’ loan to
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the general partner would be nonrecourse and secured by the
general partner’s partnership interest.159 In order to be respected,
the loan must pay interest. Abrams hypothesizes an interest rate of
6 percent.160 In order to match the current transactional structure,
the partnership would pay the general partner a fee equal to its
interest payment to the limited partners.161 The expense for that fee
would be allocated to the limited partners, and so would offset their
interest income from the loan.162 The result is the economic
equivalent of the current arrangement, and the tax consequences,
if respected, would match the current tax treatment.163 Thus, if
courts respected Abrams’s proposed loan transaction, there would
be no tax consequences from a change in the law. The only effect
would be that the lawyers would draft private equity fund agree-
ments differently to support a different legal form for the same
economic deal.164
Abrams’s proposal is intriguing, but the transaction he describes
is problematic. The reason that the transaction is problematic is
that the loan is not at a market interest rate. In fact, it is not
possible for the limited partners simultaneously to provide the
general partner with an upside profit potential, no obligation to
share in the losses, and to loan the general partner the money to
make that investment on market terms.
With Abrams’s proposed structure, the general partner would be
investing in the partnership on the same terms as the limited
partners. The general partner would contribute 20 percent of the
capital and receive 20 percent of the sale proceeds.165 Similarly, the
limited partners’ contributions and interests are proportionate.
They would contribute 80 percent of the capital and receive 80
percent of the sale proceeds.166 For the 20 percent of the capital that
the limited partners lend (on a nonrecourse basis) to the general
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169. In other words, what makes Abrams’s proposed transaction appear to work is an
artificially low interest payment that disguises the fee paid to the general partner as the
purchase of a capital share.
170. The analysis in the text suggests that the proposals of Leo Schmolka and Victor
Fleischer to treat a carried interest as an interest-free loan from the limited partners that the
general partner invests in the partnership (what Fleischer calls the cost-of-capital approach)
should produce ordinary income only, not a mix of ordinary income and long-term capital gain,
as its proponents suggest. See Fleischer, supra note 6, at 38-43; Schmolka, supra note 6, at
302-08. This is because the market interest rate for such a loan (which is the ordinary income
component) would be the general partner/borrower’s entire return from the investment.
171. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L.
REV. 715, 762 n.97 (2008).
172. I.R.C. § 482 (2000).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (2007).
partner, however, the limited partners bear all of the risk of loss.167
Their gain, however, would be capped—in Abrams’s example—at 6
percent per year.168 Thus, the loan to the general partner is a less
attractive investment than a direct investment in the partnership.
Accordingly, each limited partner would rather the other limited
partners made the loan and that it did not. Thus, the loan to the
general partner cannot be said to bear a market interest rate. 
Moreover, this problem cannot be cured by raising the interest
rate on the loan to 8 or 10 or even 20 percent. In order to provide the
limited partners with a market return on the  loan—the same
return that they earn on their capital contributions (because the
downside exposure is the same)—the general partner/borrower must
pay any and all profits on its 20 percent interest to the limited
partners/lenders.169 That would leave the general partner without
any interest in the profits of the partnership. Presumably, such a
profit interest would have to be provided directly, in which case it
would be taxed at ordinary income tax rates.170
In responding to the argument above, David Weisbach argues171
that if the government were to challenge such a loan transaction, it
would have to resort to Section 482, which deals with non-arm’s
length transfer prices.172 That is because the provisions that deal
most directly with low interest rate loans require only that a party
pay at least the government interest rate.173 They do not specifically
require a higher interest rate just because an arm’s length lender
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174. Id. If those provisions control, then Abrams’s transaction would be respected. It would
be respected, however, only because the law does not require a market interest rate.
175. See, e.g., W. Braun Co. v. Comm’r, 396 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1968); Advance Mach. Exch.
v. Comm’r, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1952).
176. Weisbach, supra note 171, at 760-62.
177. Id.
178. Id.
would require one.174 Section 482 is very broad, and although the
government invokes it in many disputes, the government is rarely
successful in those challenges.175 Thus, Weisbach argues, Abrams’s
proposed loan transaction might be able to withstand a court
challenge. Nevertheless, I believe it fair to say that there would be
substantial uncertainty surrounding the viability of such a transac-
tion should it be challenged in court.
B. Converting Limited Partners into Creditors
David Weisbach has made a second proposal; he suggests that
limited partners recharacterize their private equity investments.176
Instead of making capital contributions into limited partnerships,
he suggests that private equity investors make loans to the general
partner or to single member partnerships where the general partner
is the only partner.177 These loans would be on the same economic
terms as current limited partnership interests.178
Thus, for a typical private equity fund with a 20 percent carry,
the loan would provide for return of capital plus interest equal to 80
percent of the increase in value. Assuming that such a characteriza-
tion of the transaction were respected, there would be no carried
interest payment to tax as ordinary income. Instead, the general
partner’s interest would resemble the “sweat equity” of an entrepre-
neur. All of the gain from the sale of a portfolio company would
generate long-term capital gain. Moreover, the general partner’s
payments to the creditors out of profits would be taxed as interest
payments. To the extent that the general partner had ordinary
investment income, it could use those ordinary deductions to offset
that income, which would otherwise be taxed at a 35 percent tax
rate. Past that point, it could use its deductions to offset capital
gains. Thus, at the very least, the interest deduction would offset
the profits paid to the outside investors as interest, leaving only the
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profit retained by the general partner, which would be long-term
capital gain.
As for the limited partners, most would be unaffected by the
recharacterization of their profit shares as loans. Untaxed in-
vestors—mainly nonprofits and foreigners—would be unaffected.179
Similarly, corporations, because they have the same tax rate for
both ordinary income and capital gains, would also be unaffected.180
Wealthy taxpaying individuals, however, would be worse off because
they would have ordinary interest income instead of long-term
capital gains. Fund investors might replace such investors, which
account for about 20 percent of capital,181 with investors who are
indifferent between receiving interest and long-term capital gain. 
The potential problems with this transaction are twofold. First,
will the transaction be respected? In the corporate context, there is
a long, confused, and, at times, contentious history of attempting to
separate debt from equity. If that jurisprudence is incorporated into
the partnership context, the transaction might not be effective.
Second, even if the transaction would work under current law, any
legislation that taxed carried interests as ordinary income might
also tax, or at least attempt to tax, such a work-around. 
C. Transferring Deductions to Portfolio Firms
In this section, I offer a third possible transactional response.
That response is to transfer the deductions from paying the carry
from limited partners to portfolio companies by having portfolio
companies pay the carry. Thus, instead of the limited partners
paying the general partner a 20 percent carried interest, the general
partner would enter into an agreement with the portfolio companies
(with the consent of the limited partners) whereby the general
partner would provide services to the portfolio companies in
exchange for a payment that would replicate the payment on a 20
percent carried interest.
If the taxation of carried interests is reformed, most limited
partners would get no benefit from deducting the carry against their
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182. Tax-exempt and foreign limited partners are indifferent to taxes, and domestic
corporations are indifferent between an offset to capital gain, as under current law, or a
deduction, under various proposals. See supra notes 92, 101, 103 and accompanying text.
183. Such an expense would then be allowable as a deduction under Section 162. I.R.C. §
162 (LexisNexis 2008).
184. I.R.C. § 197 (2000).
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186. For example, if off-the-shelf tax shelters were readily available, the portfolio
companies would be effectively untaxed, and the deductions would have no value. Similarly,
if the capital structure and operations of such firms were such that they would not have
taxable income for many years, even if they were successful, the deductions would have little
value. Alternatively, if a successful company would generate large amounts of taxable income
while it paid down its debt, the structure would shelter that income, and the deductions would
be very valuable.
ordinary income instead of as an offset to long term capital gain.182
That deduction, however, can have value to the portfolio companies
in which private equity funds invest. For such companies, the
payment of a contingent fee to a private equity firm in exchange for
its assistance in selecting the directors, hiring the managers, and
helping to restructure and operate the business would likely qualify
as an ordinary and necessary business expense. That expense might
be immediately deductible, or at least deductible when paid, as are
salaries and other forms of compensation.183 Alternatively, the
company might have to capitalize that expense and amortize it over
time.184 If such expenses were capitalized, they would most likely be
recovered using straight-line amortization over a fifteen-year
period.185 Using a 5 percent discount rate, the present value of the
tax savings with such an amortization schedule would be 77 percent
of face value. For a corporation that is otherwise taxable at a 35
percent tax rate, the value of that expenditure would be the same as
an immediate deduction at a 27 percent tax rate. 
The key question raised by the structure described above is what
value, if any, would the deduction from paying the carry—whether
taken immediately or allowed over time—have to the portfolio
company? That depends upon various features of the portfolio
company, including its capital structure, its future performance, and
its available sources of tax shelter. If the managers of private equity
funds were confident that their successful portfolio companies would
owe little or no corporate income tax, then the deduction would have
little or no value.186 In such circumstances, the structure would not
be utilized because it would not create any value for the parties.
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189. This estimate is calculated as follows. The general partner receives 20 percent of the
profits and the remaining 80 percent is split according to the capital contribution. Thus,
wealthy individual limited partners would receive 16 percent of the profits as do corporations.
The 20 percent share received by the general partner would be taxed at 35 percent and so
contributes 7 percent to the tax rate. The 16 percent share received by wealthy individuals
would be taxed at 15 percent and so contributes 2.4 percent. And the 16 percent share
received by corporations would be taxed at 35 percent and so contributes 5.6 percent. Adding
up all of the pieces gives a combined tax rate of 15 percent. That 15 percent tax rate is not
applied to the deduction, but only to the after-tax savings from the deduction. Thus, because
the deduction generates a tax saving at 35 percent, the additional tax is 35 percent of 15
percent, or about 5 percent.
190. The calculations in this paragraph assume that carried interests would be treated as
ordinary income when received and as ordinary expense when paid.
Alternatively, if successful portfolio companies were likely to pay
the corporate income tax at full marginal rates (35 percent),187 then
the benefit from such a structure could be substantial. Not only
would the deduction for the payment of the carry be utilized, but
because it would be utilized by a portfolio company, as opposed to a
limited partner, the recapture of that deduction would be deferred
indefinitely. That is because free-standing Subchapter C corpora-
tions are rarely sold in taxable asset deals—the only circumstance
in which corporate level tax is paid by the acquired corporation.188
The only additional tax paid upon realization that is a result of the
company deducting the cost of the carry would be the additional tax
paid by the partners when the fund sells the portfolio company on
the increased value of the corporation (because it has more cash). I
estimate the present value of that tax would be about 5 percent of
the carry.189 It thus follows that the present value of the tax saving
for a portfolio corporation that pays the carry and is taxed at 35
percent would be 30 percent of that carry.190 
If instead of being deducted immediately the carry were capital-
ized and amortized over time, then the value of the tax saving to the
portfolio corporation would be 77 percent of the tax paid by the
general partner or 27 percent of the carry. The present value of the
additional tax paid by the partners directly would then be 4 percent
and so the tax saving would be 23 percent of the carry. Whether
payment of the carry was deducted immediately or capitalized and
amortized over time, the potential tax savings from shifting the
deduction from paying the carry from the limited partners to the
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191. The additional tax paid by the general partner would be a multiple of the capital gains
preference (20 percent); the additional tax saving would be a multiple of the corporate tax rate
(35 percent). In effect, limited partners still get an offset to long-term capital gain because
payment of the carry by portfolio companies reduces their gain.
192. This empirical question deserves attention.
portfolio companies would exceed the incremental tax collected from
the general partner on its carried interest—20 percent of the
carry.191 That difference would also provide some leeway for portfolio
companies that cannot use all of their allowable deductions. Of
course, the actual value generated by such a structure depends upon
the value to portfolio companies of the deduction from paying
carried interests.192
D. Summary
In this Part, I have described three possible structural responses
that private equity firms might consider if carried interests were to
be taxed as ordinary income. If the first transaction—loans from the
limited partners to the general partner—works and were adopted,
then private equity tax reform would raise no revenue. The form of
the contract would simply change—without affecting the economic
deal—and the Treasury would obtain no additional revenue. If the
second transaction—raising capital from the limited partners in the
form of debt rather than equity—works and were adopted, then
much of the revenue impact of the change would be eliminated. And,
if the 20 percent of private equity capital that comes from wealthy
taxpaying individuals were replaced by capital from other sources,
then there would be no revenue effect. The first two transactions,
however, are legally problematic or at least uncertain. If investors
and fund managers, however, can get confident that either transac-
tion will be respected, then private equity tax reform would likely
raise very little, if any, tax revenue.
The third transaction—transferring the deductions from paying
the carry from limited partners to portfolio companies, by having
the portfolio companies pay the carry to the general partner—also
has potential. That structure, however, will create value for the
parties only if the portfolio companies have the capacity to make use
of the additional deductions. 
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193. If the reform were to maintain the current tax treatment of limited partners, so that
for them the payment of the carry remained an offset against long-term capital gain, then
limited partnership interests would continue to be taxed like other equity investments. In
that case, there would be no specific tax clientele for private equity limited partnership
interests and no tax benefit from replacing other limited partner investors with wealthy
taxpaying individuals. Hence, in such circumstances, the legal incidence of the reform would
fall solely on the general partner with no offsetting benefits to any limited partners. Under
those circumstances, the tax consequences of reform would likely be borne by the industry
because they could not be avoided by changing the composition of the partnerships.
194. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
195. See id.
         VI. CHANGING THE COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE EQUITY        
PARTNERSHIPS
If the above structural responses are ineffective, private equity
fund managers and investors might still be able to blunt the impact
of private equity tax reform by changing the composition of their
partnerships.193 In this Part, I consider the possibility of such a
response.
Under current law, the holder of a limited partnership interest in
a private equity fund holds a capital asset.194 The gain from selling
that asset is long-term capital gain and the payment of the carried
interest to the general partner offsets long-term capital gain.195
Thus, from the perspective of the limited partner, the partnership
interest is taxed in the same manner as any equity-type investment.
Accordingly, limited partnership interests do not have a specific tax
clientele, which is consistent with them being held by investors with
a range of tax profiles. That, however, will change if carried
interests are taxed as ordinary income to the general partner and
generate an ordinary deduction for the limited partner. 
After such a reform, private equity limited partnership interests
would be tax-advantaged assets. Each limited partner would have
long-term capital gain on its share of the gain before payment of the
carry and would receive an ordinary deduction for its share of the
carry. To an untaxed investor or to a corporate investor, a deduction
against ordinary income would be no more valuable than an offset
to long-term capital gain. Such a deduction, however, would be more
valuable to a taxpayer with a capital gain preference. For wealthy
taxpaying individuals, the ordinary deduction generates a tax
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196. Under current law, the general partner earns 17 percent, 20 percent x (1 - .15), after
taxes. In order to earn the same 17 percent after tax with a 35 percent tax rate, the general
partner would have to earn 26.15 percent, or 17.5 percent / (1 - .35), before tax. The
adjustment is somewhat more complicated when the timing is also accelerated. In that case,
the limited partners would make a cash payment to the general partner at grant equal to the
general partner’s tax (and the limited partners’ tax saving) at the ordinary income tax rate
grossed up by one minus that tax rate. There also would be a payment in the opposite
direction at realization equal to the general partner’s tax saving from basis (and limited
partners’ tax increase because of the lost offset) at the capital gains tax rate grossed up by
that tax rate. See Sanchirico, supra note 10, at 20-21.
197. The structure of the transaction or the composition of the limited partnership can be
changed going forward, but such changes cannot be made for existing transactions unless the
parties to that transaction agree. And there is little reason for the limited partners to agree
when the additional tax is imposed on the general partner only.
198. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
benefit at 35 percent, whereas the capital gain offset generates a
benefit at only 15 percent. Thus, wealthy individuals will find
private equity limited partnership interests taxed more attractively
than other similar investments. That is to say, wealthy individuals
would form the tax clientele for private equity limited partnership
interests.
As a result, wealthy individuals would presumably be willing to
pay more for such tax-advantaged limited partnership interests
than they currently pay for such interests without those added tax
benefits. Indeed, a wealthy individual who is willing to pay a 20
percent carried interest under current law would presumably be
willing to pay a 26.15 percent carried interest to that same fund
manager, if payment of the carry were deductible against ordinary
income.196 Similarly, the general partner is as well off with a 20
percent carried interest under current law as it would be with a
26.15 percent carried interest taxed at ordinary income tax rates.197
Thus, one likely effect of reform is to see wealthy taxpaying
individuals contributing more capital and untaxed and corporate
investors contributing less capital. Because wealthy taxpaying
individuals account for roughly 20 percent of private equity capital
currently,198 there is substantial room for growth. Thus, if carried
interest reform is enacted, I would expect to see private equity firms
making a bigger effort to recruit wealthy individual investors. It
might be thought that given their low starting point, a large
increase is unlikely. Because private equity is still a relatively small
share of the investment market, however, individuals could increase
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199. See Josh Lerner & Antionette Schoar, The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence
from Private Equity, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4-5 (2004).
200. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN’S AMENDMENT
IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 3996 (2007).
201. H.R. 3996, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
202. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
203. The JCT assumed that the law would have taken effect before the beginning of 2008.
See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 200.
their investment in private equity markedly without sharply
drawing down their investments in other areas.
The potential problem I see with a move away from institutional
and corporate investors and towards individual investors has more
to do with agency costs than with raising capital. Private equity
firms often prefer large investors. They keep transaction costs low,
but more importantly large investors restrain agency problems by
monitoring performance.199 Such monitoring is more difficult to
induce with smaller investors because each investor has a stronger
incentive to free ride off the efforts of other investors. And shifting
that responsibility to intermediaries raises its own set of agency
problems. 
VII. THE JOINT COMMITTEE’S TAX REVENUE ESTIMATE
In October 2007, the JCT released its estimate of the revenue
consequences of taxing carried interests at ordinary income tax
rates when received.200 That estimate was part of the revenue
estimate for a large tax reform bill, H.R. 3996, introduced by
Representative Rangel.201 The carried interest provision in H.R.
3996 was almost identical to that in H.R. 2834, introduced by
Representative Sander Levin (D-MI), which only addressed carried
interests.202 The JCT estimated the revenue effects from such
provisions for ten years from 2008 through 2017.203 The estimates
in the JCT report are as follows:
160 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:115
204. The JCT makes estimates to the nearest million dollars even if the amounts are large
and the precision surrounding those estimates is poor.
205. All of the numbers I give in this Article assume that there is no restructuring or
change in the composition of the partners. I discuss qualitatively, not quantitatively, the
impact of restructuring and changing the composition of the partners.
206. See Donmoyer, supra note 20.
Table 7
JCT Estimated Revenue Effects of Taxing Carried Interests as
Ordinary Income
(millions of dollars)
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2,661 3,232 3,159 2,951 2,687 2,360 2,169 2,028 2,097 2,281
I have several observations about Table 7. First, over ten years,
the total additional tax revenue is estimated to be $23.852 billion,
which averages out to $2.4 billion per year. That number is within
the range of numbers that I have given. Second, the JCT numbers
are very precise—to the nearest $1 million. They are far more
precise than anyone can be confident about.204 Third, the JCT
estimates are actual dollars, not present value dollars. Fourth, the
JCT estimate is not only for private equity. As others have pointed
out, the provision would likely also apply to investments in real
estate and natural resources in which the active partner is paid, in
whole or in part, with a profit interest. I made no attempt to
estimate the revenue from those industries because I did not have
the requisite data. Fifth, the JCT revenue estimates show additional
revenue reaching a peak in 2009 and then declining by about one-
third over the next five years. Thus, the JCT estimates seem to
imply that the JCT believes there will be substantial restructuring
or composition changes that will reduce tax collections.205
CONCLUSION
This Article has been described as the first academic attempt to
estimate the revenue consequences of changing the tax treatment
of private equity fund managers’ carried interests.206 It seeks to
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determine how much additional tax revenue the federal government
would collect if carried interests were taxed as ordinary income and
if that tax were accelerated to the date of grant. Assuming no
change in the composition of limited partners and that the structure
of private equity funds does not change, I estimate that taxing
carried interests at ordinary income rates and accelerating taxation
to grant would increase the present value of additional tax collec-
tions by between 1 and 1.5 percent of invested capital each year. Of
that amount, accelerating taxation would account for 10 to 20
percent of the increase; the rest would come from changing the
character of the income and expense. Assuming annual investments
by limited partners of $200 billion, the present value of additional
tax collections would be between $2 billion and $3 billion per year.
In arriving at those estimates, I assumed that the structure of
private equity funds and the composition of the limited partnerships
would not change in the event that carried interests are taxed as
ordinary income. If such a reform is enacted, private equity fund
managers and investors will have a strong incentive to find
alternative structures to undo the effect of any reform. And if that
is not possible, they will have a strong incentive to change the
composition of their limited partnerships by substituting wealthy
individuals for other limited partners in order to mitigate the tax
consequences of reform. It is thus possible that there would be little
or no net increase in tax collections from taxing carried interests as
ordinary income once the industry adjusts in response.
Finally, whatever the other merits of taxing carried interests at
ordinary tax rates, it is very clear in the context of existing budget
deficits and priorities that reforming the tax treatment of current
interests will provide relatively little tax revenue for other purposes.
For example, the annual tax cost of the AMT patch, which has been
linked to private equity tax reform, is more than 15 times the
annual tax benefit from carried interest reform, even before
allowing for any response from the private equity industry.
